



SMART CONTRACT AUDIT

Certification

STAKING CONTRACT



SMART CONTRACT AUDITS

Feb 9th, 2024 / v.0.2

Audited source code version:

2d1364e1fedf777130f89ca40de67668d202eb37

Structure and Organization of the Document

Some sections are more important than others. The most critical areas are at the top, and the less critical sections are at the bottom. The issues in these sections have been fixed or addressed and will show by the "Resolved" or "Unresolved" tags. Each case is written so you can understand how serious it is, with an explanation of whether it is a risk of exploitation or unexpected behavior.

CRITICAL

These issues can have a dangerous effect on the ability of the contract to work correctly.

HIGH

These issues significantly affect the ability of the contract to work correctly.

MEDIUM

These issues affect the ability of the contract to operate correctly but do not hinder its behavior.

LOW

These issues have a minimal impact on the contract's ability to operate.

INFORMATIONAL

These issues do not impact the contract's ability to operate.

Issues

1. Frontrun Pool

Not Addressed / HIGH

Description: There can only be one pool for a specific token. Since there are no ownership checks on the specific user that creates the pool for a token, one can frontrun the creation of the pool to the disadvantage of the well intended creator.

! Possible fix to research

Either allow for multiple pools for a specific token and allow users to decide which one to use, or add checks to ensure that the creator of the pool is also the token owner (or admin).

! Response

Will leave it as is.

! Status

Not Addressed.

2. Out of gas / read operation

Fixed / HIGH

Description: When calculating the reward for a user, the smart contract does an iteration over all the **'RewardInfo'** structs. A new **'RewardInfo'** struct is created each time the pool owner changes the APR. Assuming that there are few changes in the APR, this should not be a problem, but if the vector grows, user funds are at risk of being locked in the contract forever.

! Possible fix to research

The problem appears when the pool owner changes the APR very frequently. Add guards such that there's a cooldown between the last change in APR so the contract will try to diminish the amounts of **'RewardInfo'** created.

! Response

An only-owner function was introduced that can be used to clear old entries of the **'RewardInfo'** vector.

! Status

Accepted & Closed.

3. Out of gas / read operation

Fixed / HIGH

Description: In the view function '**getDaoMembers**', the smart contract does an iteration over all the users that are currently staking for a specific token. This can easily run out of gas / read operations when the number of users reaches a reasonable value.

! Possible fix to research

Implement the user set using an iterable method such that one can iterate all the users in a controlled manner (for example using '**offset**' and '**limit**').

! Response

The function was removed.

! Status

Accepted & Closed.

4. Full Withdraw

Fixed / MEDIUM

Description: The owner of a pool can withdraw the pool's rewards using '**withdrawRewards**' endpoint. The endpoint has an optional argument which represents the amount of the reward that he wants to withdraw. If this value is not given (being optional), one might expect to withdraw the full reward amount left but instead, the TX just fails (it tries to withdraw zero).

! Possible fix to research

Either make the parameter not-optional or add a functionality in case the value is not provided (for example, doing a full withdrawal of the rewards left).

! Response

Fixed.

! Status

Accepted & Closed.

5. Fees Leftover

Fixed / **LOW**

Description: The contract splits the fee retained when creating a new pool into two. One half to the **'treasury_address'** and the other to **'burner_address'**. However if the fee amount is an odd number, a rounding error of **'1'** will remain in the contract.

! Possible fix to research

```
Send 'amount / 2' to one address and send 'amount - amount / 2' to the other in order to avoid encountering leftovers.
```

! Response

Fixed.

! Status

Accepted & Closed.

6. Unused decimals

Fixed / **LOW**

Description: When a pool is created, **'stake_token_decimals'** is required, however it is not used in the contract.

! Possible fix to research

```
Either use the value where it was intended doing the development or remove it.
```

! Response

Fixed.

! Status

Accepted & Closed.

7. Storage name

Fixed / **INFORMATIONAL**

Description: There's a typo in the view name of the pool state storage. It is named **'getPoolte'**.

! Possible fix to research

Rename it to `'getPoolState'`.

! Response

Fixed.

! Status

Accepted & Closed.

8. Lack of tests

Not Addressed / **INFORMATIONAL**

! Status

Not Addressed.

9. Lack of interaction scripts

Not Addressed / **INFORMATIONAL**

! Status

Not Addressed.

10. Lack of documentation

Not Addressed / **INFORMATIONAL**

! Status

Not Addressed.

Verification Conditions

1 Only the owner of the streaming swap can call 'cancelStreamingSwap'.

```
#[only_owner]
#[endpoint(setCreationCost)]
fn set_pool_creation_cost(
```

2 Pool admin functions are guarded correctly.

```
self.assert_pool_owner(pool_id);
```

3 Valid payments are checked on input.

```
require!(
    stake_token_id == self.pool_stake_token_id(pool_id).get(),
    "Invalid Stake token id"
);
```

4 Actions are taken when the contract and the pool are not paused (and only on valid pools).

```
self.assert_valid_pool_id(pool_id);
self.assert_unpaused();
self.assert_pool_unpaused(pool_id);
```

Suggestions (Optional)

1. Update to latest framework version (best practice when deploying a new contract).
2. Write tests (Rust Testing Framework is recommended, documentation (at least a readme) and interaction scripts).
3. Format the code using '**cargo fmt**' and solve the warnings (check them using '**cargo clippy**').
4. Construct the '**Pool**' structure and store it inside a single storage instead of splitting pieces of information between multiple storages.

Test results

There are no tests.

Audited source code version
ef45ea78ccaa59ab2a0932f92aedcfdbea3cd791

Second Audited source code version
2d1364e1fedf777130f89ca40de67668d202eb37